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Abstract. Autonomous agents negotiating on our behalf find applica-
tions in everyday life in many domains such as high frequency trading,
cloud computing and the smart grid among others. The agents negotiate
with one another to reach the best agreement for the users they rep-
resent. An obstacle in the future of automated negotiators is that the
agent may not always have a priori information about the preferences of
the user it represents. The purpose of this work is to develop an agent
that will be able to negotiate given partial information about the user’s
preferences. First, we present a new partial information model that is
supplied to the agent, which is based on categorical data in the form of
pairwise comparisons of outcomes instead of precise utility information.
Using this partial information, we develop an estimation model that uses
linear optimization and translates the information into utility estimates.
We test our methods in a negotiation scenario based on a smart grid
cooperative where agents participate in energy trade-offs. The results
show that already with very limited information the model becomes ac-
curate quickly and performs well in an actual negotiation setting. Our
work provides valuable insight into how uncertainty affects an agent’s
negotiation performance, how much information is needed to be able to
formulate an accurate user model, and shows a capability of negotiating
effectively with minimal user feedback.
1 Introduction
Negotiation between two or more different parties is the joint decision mak-
ing process towards a satisfactory outcome for all sides. If such an outcome is
achieved, it constitutes an agreement.
In recent years there have been significant advancements in automating the
negotiation process meaning that human negotiators are being represented by
computer agents. Fully computerized negotiation offers a lot of benefits such as
achieving better (win-win) deals for all sides, reduction in negotiation duration,
and of course much reduced users’ stress and frustration due to participation
in the negotiation process [4]. Automated negotiation finds application in many
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areas, some of which are high frequency trading, cloud computing and the smart
grid. Such settings can be very dynamic, and as a result automating the negoti-
ation process becomes imperative, considering that it is very uncomfortable for
the user having to participate in negotiations so frequently, especially in domains
in which they are not knowledgeable.
A major obstacle in the future of representative automated negotiation is
the agent’s level of knowledge about the preferences of the user it represents [6].
Preference elicitation is a tedious procedure to the users since they have to in-
teract with the system repeatedly and participate in lengthy queries. To address
this challenge, the agents should be able to accurately represent the users under
minimal information about their preferences. Therefore, the agent must strike
a balance between user model accuracy and user interference. Even though re-
search in the field of automated negotiations has made progress on opponent
modeling, in most cases the agents themselves were operating under fully speci-
fied preference profiles (see Section 2). The major questions that arise from the
above problem are:
– How can we model the incomplete information about the users’ preferences
supplied to the agent in cases of uncertainty?
– How can we estimate user preferences from incomplete information?
– How does uncertainty about the user’s preferences affect an agent’s negoti-
ation performance?
In this work we address the problems associated with negotiation under un-
certainty and test the results in a scenario inspired from the smart grid. The
contributions are threefold:
– We propose a way of representing user preference information, based on cat-
egorical data, showing preference relations between different possible out-
comes.
– We present a method of estimating preference information from the incom-
plete information model based on linear optimization.
– We test the proposed method while negotiating on a smart grid cooperative
scenario, examining the accuracy of the generated preference profile as well
as actual negotiation performance.
The rest of this work is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses related work
in the field of negotiation under uncertainty. Section 3 presents the problem
setting, the key components in automated negotiation, as well as the new pro-
posed ordinal data based incomplete information model. Section 4 describes the
two proposed preference estimation methods. In Section 5 we are presenting
the results of our strategies in terms of user model accuracy and negotiation
performance, and in Section 7 we make suggestions for future work.
2 Related Work
The subject of modeling partial information about a user’s preference profile, as
well as the process of trying to formulate an accurate model of the user’s real
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preferences given incomplete information has been a topic of research through
the years, but not a lot of it has been applied in the negotiation domain.
A key area of research in the field of user-preference modeling is Multi-
Attribute Utility Theory. Many strategies have been proposed in this field, with
the target of creating a preference profile under incomplete information of the
user preferences. A large family of such strategies are the UTA (Utilite´ Addi-
tives) methods, originally proposed by Jacquet-Lagreze and Siskos in 1982 [16].
The UTA method and its extensions [14,21], obtain a ranked set of outcomes as
input and formulate a new piecewise linear utility function through the use of
linear programming. An application of the UTA method on the negotiation do-
main has been presented by Roszkowska [22]. The main limitation of the method
is that the input outcome set needs to be a complete ranking of outcomes, mean-
ing a total ordering (even though it might not include the whole outcome space).
Even though the method we propose also utilizes a ranking as input in the ex-
perimental implementation, it can also work with any arbitrary set of partial
orders.
Automated negotiation research has focused mostly on opponent preference
modeling rather than on the user preference elicitation [7, 8]. However, several
techniques in opponent modeling are of interest to our case. Jonker et. al present
an agent architecture that uses heuristics based on the opponent’s bidding se-
quence to elicit opponent preference information [17]. Even though the user’s
preference profile is considered known in these methods, opponent modeling
strategies could also be applied in user preference modeling.
Aside from multi-attribute utility theory, another option for representing user
information was proposed by Boutilier et. al [10] and studied in the negotiation
domain [6, 20]. CP-nets provide a graphical representation of conditional and
qualitative preference relations. Cornelio et al. extend the CP-net concept to
incorporate uncertainty in the networks including probabilistic elements [11],
and Aydogan et al. [1, 3] apply CP-nets theory in the negotiation domain using
heuristics on the partial ordering of attribute values to generate a total ordering
of outcomes. While CP-nets prove an effective way of representing partial infor-
mation, our method is able to make the transition to utility-based negotiation
based on ordinal data on full negotiation outcomes.
Our proposed decision model is inspired mainly by the work of Srinivasan
and Shocker [24], who proposes a strategy for estimating the weights of differ-
ent attributes given a set of pairwise comparisons of outcomes by using linear
programming. The main limitation of this model, apart from the fact that it is
limited to weight estimation, is that the evaluations of the stimuli values that
appear on the comparison set need to be known. We extend this model to pro-
pose a different formulation of the problem using categorical data that estimates
complete preference profiles based on the outcome set. We also formulate a sim-
plified version of related work [24] for estimating the different negotiation issue
weights.
4 D. Tsimpoukis et al.
Fig. 1. Negotiation Setting
3 Problem Setting
3.1 Problem Description
Let us consider a setting where a computer agent is negotiating with an opponent
agent on behalf of a user it is supposed to represent. The agents are exchanging
bids (offers) to reach an agreement. The user that an agent represents has a
set of preferences towards particular outcomes and the agent tries to achieve a
negotiation outcome that satisfies these preferences as best as possible. This is
schematically illustrated in Figure 1.
In a typical setting, an agent representing the user is assumed to have a
utility function that fully describes the user’s preference profile and translates
every possible outcome to marginal values. However, the agent in a negotiation
setting dost not necessarily have a priori, a fully specified user preference model,
which we will call user model. Part of the reason is the user’s discomfort to
engage with the system continuously.
Consider a typical example in a smart grid domain where a user would have to
interact with the energy management system in his residence to update his pref-
erences. This is a tedious procedure to the user, which requires lengthy queries
and on occasion even the user himself might not be sure about his preferences
due to lack of negotiation domain knowledge. As a result, agents have to be
able to negotiate on partial information about the user preferences, whilst also
querying the user for additional information as little as possible.
In cases of uncertainty an agent might be provided with an initial set of
information that might be known to it from domain knowledge, previous inter-
actions with the user, past negotiation data etc. The information obtained from
querying the user is another important concept when an agent needs to elicit
information about the user’s preferences. It may be difficult to query the user
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for precise utility information, but, on the other hand, it could be much easier
for a user to compare outcomes. To that regard, we will propose a partial infor-
mation model based on ranked outcomes by the user which will be the initial
information supplied to the agents.
Our goal is to formulate a strategy, where an agent will be able to generate a
utility function that will approximate the real utility function as best as possible
given a partial information model based on a set of ranked outcomes that are
obtained from queries.
3.2 Formal Model
We present the key elements of a negotiation model architecture under preference
uncertainty. These are: the negotiation protocol, the negotiation scenario, the
users’ preference profiles, the agents’ negotiation tactics, presented below.
Negotiation domain During a negotiation, the participants are trying to reach
an agreement over m issues which we denote as I = {1, ......,m}. For example,
in the case of a smart grid collective these can include the price at which the
energy is traded, the need for green energy utilization, the willingness to share,
etc. Every issue i is discrete; i.e. each issue can take a finite number of ni values
which we denote as:
Vi =
{
x
(i)
1 , x
(i)
2 , ......, x
(i)
ni
}
. (1)
The negotiation domain Ω = V1 × V2 × . . . × Vm is the set of all possible
negotiation outcomes. A negotiation outcome ω ∈ Ω is thus an m–tuple that
assigns a single value ωi ∈ Vi to every issue i, such as “0.15 e/kWh” for the
issue “price of energy to be traded”.
Negotiation Protocol The negotiation protocol dictates the actions that can
be performed by an agent at any given moment. We will be using the widely used
Alternating Offers Protocol, where each participant gets a turn per round [8]. On
each turn, the agent can accept or propose a counter-offer (or bid)to the last offer
by the opponent.
A negotiation deadline can be specified as the maximum number of negoti-
ation rounds, or in real time quantities. If an agreement has not been achieved
within the time-frame specified by the deadline, the negotiation ends and all
participants obtain utility zero. We assume the negotiation deadline is universal
and known to all participating agents [8, 13].
Preference Profile Every user participating in a negotiation has a specific set
of preferences regarding the possible outcomes. The preference profile is given
by an ordinal ranking over the set of possible outcomes: an outcome ω is said to
be weakly preferred over an outcome ω′ if ω  ω′ where ω, ω′ ∈ Ω, or strictly
preferred if ω  ω′.
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Under mild assumptions [18], preference profiles can be expressed in a cardi-
nal way through the use of a utility function such that:
ω  ω′ ⇐⇒ u(ω) ≥ u(ω′). (2)
There is an outcome of minimum acceptable utility which is called reservation
value[5, 12].
We will focus on linear additive utility functions, in which every issue i’s
value is calculated separately according to an evaluation function vi as follows:
u : Ω 7→ [0, 1] ⊆ R with u(ω) =
m∑
i=1
wi · vi(ωi), (3)
where
m∑
i=1
wi = 1. (4)
Here, wi are the normalized weights that indicate the importance of each issue
to the user, and vi(ωi) is the evaluation function that maps the i
th issue value
to a utility. Note that the linear utility function does not take dependencies
between issues into account. Alternatively, non-linear utility functions can be
incorporated to describe such dependencies [2, 15,19].
Agent The agent’s bidding strategy defines the agent’s structuring of the bids
during a negotiation [4], mapping negotiation states to an action (Acceptance,
or a Counter-offer in the Alternating Offers Protocol). The agent can perform
better with an idea of the opponents’ preferences and bidding strategy through
opponent modeling techniques to propose bids which are more likely to be ac-
cepted [7, 23].
Well-known bidding strategies include the time-dependent bidding tactics
where the result of the decision functions is based on the time passed in the
negotiation [9, 13] as follows:
u(t) = Pmin + (Pmax − Pmin) · (1− F (t)), (5)
F (t) = k + (1− k) · (1− k) · t 1e , (6)
where Pmin, Pmax are the minimum and maximum accepted offers, t is the nor-
malized3 time t ∈ [0, 1] and k ∈ [0, 1] is the utility of the first offer. If 0 < e < 1
the agent does not reduce its target utility in the early stages of the negotiation
and concedes at the end of the deadline [9,13]. The agent that follows this type
of strategy is called Boulware. In the opposite case of e ≥ 1, the agent is called
Conceder as it concedes to its reservation value (Pmin) very quickly.
3 The time range of a negotiation usually is [0, D] where D is the deadline in rounds
or time units and is normalized to the values [0, 1] .
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User Model The representative agent has a user model, which consists of the
agent’s beliefs about the user’s preferences. We assume the agent is supplied
with an initial set of answers to queries to the user, in the form of a user ranking
O ⊆ Ω of d different negotiation outcomes [24]:
O =
{
o(1), o(2), . . . , o(d)
}
, (7)
where o(1)  o(2) · · ·  o(d), o(i) ∈ Ω.
This set will usually only contain a fraction of all outcomes Ω and hence deter-
mines its level of uncertainty. Note that this notation allows us to denote the
ith issue value of an outcome o(j) ∈ O with o(j)i as before. The ranking O can
alternatively be expressed as a set of d− 1 pairwise comparisons:
D = {(o(j), o(j+1)) | o(j) ∈ O and 0 < j ≤ d− 1}. (8)
Given the outcome ranking O, the agent’s goal is to formulate its own esti-
mated utility function uˆ(ω) that approximates the real utility function u(ω) as
much as possible. Establishing ‘the most likely’ utility function from a ranking of
outcomes O is complicated, as there is far less information available in D than
in u(ω). Furthermore, O might not contain any information about particular
outcomes, especially in large domains, requiring completion of the ordering.
4 Estimating a utility function from a user model
If an agent is to operate under a non-fully specified preference profile, it needs
to formulate a strategy that will be able to derive a utility function from a set of
pairwise comparisons of outcomes. To do so, we will extend an approach followed
in [24].
Consider a ranking O of negotiation outcomes and the set D of correspond-
ing pairwise comparisons. Given the pairwise comparisons, the same inequality
should hold for the utility function of the agent (2). From the definition of the
utility function (2), we can integrate the weight and each evaluator value in one
variable and we rewrite (3) as:
u : Ω 7→ [0, 1] ⊆ R with u(ω) =
m∑
i=1
φi(ωi), (9)
with φi(ωi) = wi · vi(ωi). (10)
This results in a new discrete set of variables
Y =
{
φ1(x
(1)
1 ), . . . , φ1(x
(1)
n1 ), φ2(x
(2)
1 ), . . . , φ2(x
(2)
n2 ), φm(x
(m)
1 ) . . . , φm(x
(m)
nm )
}
.
(11)
With one additional piece of information, estimating the utility function can
be translated into a linear optimization problem with the set Y as the set of
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unknown variables. For each pairwise comparison between outcomes (o, o′) ∈ D
we derive from (2) and (9) that:
m∑
i=1
(φi(oi)− φi(o′i)) ≥ 0, with φi(oi), φi(o′i) ∈ Y. (12)
We denote the above term as ∆uo,o′ so
∆uo,o′ =
m∑
i=1
(φi(oi)− φi(o′i)), ∆uo,o′ ≥ 0. (13)
Now, we can translate the above inequalities into a linear optimization problem
using standard linear programming techniques. For this, we need to consider
‘slack variables’ namely zo,o′ and the linear program is formulated as:
Minimize:
∑
(o,o′)∈D
zo,o′ = F, (14)
subject to the constraints:
zo,o′ +∆uo,o′ ≥ 0, (15)
zo,o′ ≥ 0, for (o, o′) ∈ D, (16)
φi(x
(i)
j ) ≥ 0, for i ∈ I, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., ni} . (17)
In its current form the optimization problem yields the trivial solution where
all φi(x
(i)
j ) = 0, zo,o′ = 0. To tackle this problem an additional constraint is
required. Hence, arises the need for some additional piece of information about
the preferences of the user. In our solution, the additional information is the best
outcome for the user, i.e. the outcome of maximum utility ω∗. Note that this
does not mean that we know the importance of each separate issue, but only
that particular outcome that is the most desired from the user. This translates
into our final constraint for the optimization problem:
u(ω∗) = 1 ⇒
m∑
i=1
φ′i(ω
∗
i ) = 1. (18)
From the constraints (15) and (16) we can see that
zo,o′ ≥ max{0, −∆uo,o′}. (19)
Given that the goal is to minimize F , the optimal solution will be
z∗o,o′ = max{0, −∆uo,o′}. (20)
We should note at this point that, in the case that the initial judgment about
the comparisons in D is correct, ∆ujk will always be positive. As a result all
zo,o′ will equal 0. This is an interesting attribute of this method, since it can
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determine and pinpoint errors in user judgment as well. If all the zo,o′ are not
zero after solving the linear program, there is no solution set that satisfies all
the comparisons in D. This means that at lease one stated judgment regarding
the preference of two or more outcomes is wrong. This can prove very important
when the agent queries the user for information, in cases where the user is not
entirely sure about their preferences or does not have complete knowledge of the
negotiation domain and might give wrong feedback about their own preferences.
With our method these errors in user feedback can be pinpointed and addressed.
5 Experiments and Results
5.1 Setup
Scenario To show that our proposed model is applicable in a real negotiation
setting we conducted experiments in a simulation of a negotiation scenario. The
scenario is inspired by the smart grid domain and refers to a fictitious energy
cooperative, where different residents participate in energy exchanges. The issues
of negotiation consist of the amount of energy bought or sold in different periods
of time, which in electrical energy systems are called Programme Time Units
(PTUs), and the type of energy exchanged (Green, Conventional). The possible
issue values for every PTU are {-3kWh, -2kWh, ...,+2kWh, +3kWh}. The sign
of the value corresponds to whether the the user buys or sells the given amount
of energy. After an agreement is reached, for every PTU the amount sold by one
user is bought by the opponent. We created different preference profiles based
on different energy requirements patterns.
Measures We selected two metrics to evaluate our model: accuracy towards
the real preference profile and negotiation performance.
To evaluate our model in terms of accuracy we compare the estimated weights
and evaluator values compare to the real preference profile. The comparison was
made in terms of 3 different accuracy measures: the Pearson Correlation Coef-
ficient, the Spearman Ranking Coefficient of bids between the entire resulting
utility space and the real utility space, and the maximum single bid utility
distance in the set. The Pearson Correlation Coefficient assesses linear relation-
ships between the two utility functions, while the Spearman Correlation assesses
monotonic relations based on their rank. The accuracy measures experiments
were performed on two scenarios with 3 (2 PTUs & Type of Energy) and 5 (4
PTUs & Type of Energy) issues respectively. In practice, the outcome space of
the 5 issue domain is 5000 times bigger than the 3 issue one. The calculations
were the result of averaging after 100 iterations for each uncertainty level.
Apart from the accuracy measures, we also investigate the influence of pref-
erence uncertainty in an actual negotiation and how well an agent performs in
this setup using our utility estimation strategies. To do so, we examined the
trace of the target utilities throughout a negotiation session of the Conceder
agent, presented in Section 3.2. To monitor the complete negotiation trace, we
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pitted the Conceder agent against a never-accepting agent. The deadline was set
at 180 rounds and the negotiation domain only on a 5-issue smart grid scenario
(4 PTUs & Type of Energy).
Baseline Strategy We tested our strategy against a simple preference esti-
mation method called Benchmarking Strategy, based on the intuition that the
more desired outcomes appear in the high positions of the ranked outcome set
O = {o(1), o(2), . . . , o(d)}. According to this method, all issue values occurring
in o(i) are awarded d− i points (for example, the values that make up the most
preferred outcome o(1) all receive maximum points). These scores are summed
for every i and then renormalized to values between 0 and 1 to determine the
final score for each value of every issue.
Weight Estimation Strategy In some negotiation scenarios the preferences
for each issue might be known but the importance of each issue to the user is not.
For this case we created a simpler strategy based on our Linear Programming
model where the evaluator functions are known but the weights are not. The
solving strategy is exactly the same to the one presented in Section 4, with
the difference that the unknown variables are the issue weights only, since the
evaluator values are known. Hence, we replace the final constraint (18) with (4),
which states that the sum of the weights must equal 1.
5.2 Results
Accuracy Measures Figure 2 presents the accuracy of the model compared
to the real preferences for 2 different domain sizes: 3 and 5 issues. The level of
uncertainty is expressed as the number of outcomes that appear on the ranked
set that is supplied to the agent. The first thing that we infer from the accu-
racy result figures is that our model becomes very accurate even with very few
comparisons (less than 1% of the d − 1 required for a perfect ranking of the
outcomes). Both our models outperform the benchmark strategy significantly.
Especially in the Weight Estimation case, all measures rapidly converge to the
desired values. This is reasonable if we consider the fact that in this case the
evaluator functions are considered known, which is already a very large amount
of information about the user preferences. To verify this claim, we ran a test case
for the 5 issue domain where the agent was supplied with 0 comparisons and the
weights were set to 0.2. The results yielded Pearson and Spearman coefficient
values above 0.7, which indicates relatively high accuracy even when the weights
are off.
We present the results up until 150 comparisons for each experiment since
all metrics converge to their final values by then. However, we need to remark
that only the Spearman correlation coefficient reaches its target value of 1 in
the case of a total ranking of outcomes (d − 1 comparisons). This means that
although the actual values of the weights and corresponding utilities might not
be exactly the same the ranking of outcomes is correct.
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Fig. 2. Accuracy measures of simulations. The horizontal axis represents the size of
the outcome ranking that is supplied to the agent and the vertical axis the different
metric values.
Negotiation Performance: The accuracy results suggest that our models
should perform well in an actual negotiation setting. To visualize the perfor-
mance of our models in an actual negotiation, we visualize the Conceder agents
traces for different amounts of comparisons for a whole negotiation session (180
rounds). That is, we observe the target utilities that are proposed at any given
round of negotiation according to the conceder strategy. Figure 3 shows these
traces for different amounts of preference information when following the Bench-
mark Strategy and our proposed Linear Programming Strategy as an estimation
method. The superiority of the Linear Programming model becomes evident, as
with a small amount of comparisons (d ≤ 50) the real trace is followed almost
perfectly, whereas the Benchmark model does not even for a much higher amount
of comparisons (d = 1000). For 50 comparisons, the sum over all rounds of the
average bid distances (averaged over 100 iterations) of the trace compared to the
real trace was 2.564 following the Baseline strategy, compared to 0.120 following
the Linear Programming strategy.
The negotiation results mirror the knowledge we obtained from the accuracy
experiments. Given that at around 50 outcomes our method yields a Spearman’s
rank coefficient of ρ ' 1, the user model becomes fully accurate, hence the
negotiation performance is not be affected. For the benchmark strategy on the
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Fig. 3. Target utilities for a Conceder agent strategy under different levels of uncer-
tainty using the Benchmark Strategy and the Linear Programming Strategy
other hand, the trace never converges to the real profile. This is explained by the
fact that the benchmark method takes only the evaluator values into account
during its reasoning and not the issues’ importance (weights) at all. This can
result at wrong issue weights, which in turn affects the performance negatively.
6 Conclusion
We presented an information model that is based on categorical data and has
the form of a partial order of outcomes. This form of information may be readily
elicited by asking a user to compare outcomes. Given this input, the agent needs
to find the best sequence of queries that elicits as much preference information
as possible while minimizing user bother.
We created a decision model that utilizes the pairwise comparison informa-
tion, and through the use of linear programming we estimated a linear additive
utility function, which the agent will use to negotiate. The proposed decision
model was tested in terms of user-model accuracy and negotiation performance.
The accuracy results showed that even with a very small numbers of compar-
isons (less than 1% of a total ranking of outcomes), the agent can reach high
levels of accuracy (Spearman ρ ' 1.0). We achieved similar results in perfor-
mance tests, with negotiation agreement utilities reaching no-uncertainty levels.
Finally, our proposed Linear Programing model outperformed a baseline model
both in terms of accuracy, as well as performance.
In a nutshell, we created a model that obtains incomplete ordinal prefer-
ence data in the form of rankings and through the use of linear programming
approximates the preferences of the user as best as possible. The results show
that even given a few outcome comparisons (i.e user queries), together with the
knowledge of the overall best bid, an agent can improve the user model accuracy
significantly, and negotiates well as a result.
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7 Discussion and future work
Computerized agents poised to represent users in negotiations should do so under
incomplete information about the preferences of the users they represent. This
work is a first step towards a reliable way of implementing such automated
negotiation under preference uncertainty.
In this work, we present a method of representing incomplete user-preference
information and a decision model that utilizes rankings of outcomes to elicit
as much information as possible. We focus on bilateral negotiation, but pave
the way for future work to examine how uncertainty affects an agent against
multiple opponents. It is reasonable to expect that when facing more opponents
the margin of error for an uncertain agent is smaller given that mistakes are
more likely to be exploited.
Furthermore, our model allows the incorporation of error in user feedback and
is able to pinpoint inconsistencies in user judgment, which could prove useful in
cases where the agent does not have enough knowledge about the domain or is
not certain about the user fidelity. The effect of judgment error could also be
further examined, e.g., on a total ranking of outcomes.
One last avenue for future work would be to test the model’s performance in
more heterogeneous scenarios. The results show small differences in the amount
of comparisons needed for high user model accuracy levels for various domains
sizes. This is explained by the fact that there is only a small increase in the num-
ber of linear utility function parameters relative to the size of the outcome space.
This finding may change for real-life domains without the linear attributes that
we assume in our model. Possible interdependencies between negotiation issues
would require non-linear optimization techniques and new and more complex
preference elicitation strategies.
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